...stuff I do and things I like...

Sunday, February 19 2017

ENISA Smartphone Development Guidelines

The European Union Agency for Network and Information Security (ENISA) asked Ioannis Stais, Vincenzo Iozzo, and myself to update their guidelines for secure smartphone app development. The result is not much of an update but an entire rewrite of the guidelines. It was a fun project to do and I think all parties involved in the project are proud of the final result.

The Smartphone Development Guidelines website provides a brief overview of the effort. The actual document can be downloaded here Smartphone_development_Guidelines.pdf

I would like to thank everybody again who helped on the project the project coordinators at ENISA and everybody who reviewed the document and provided feedback!

Tuesday, January 24 2017

Mobile Security News Update January 2017

Conferences
    Recon Brussels Brussels, 27-29 January. Analyzing iOS apps: road from AppStore to security analysis report by Lenar Safin, Yaroslav Alexandrov, Egor Fominykh, Alexander Chernov.

    31CON Auckland NZ, 23-24 February. RAVISHANKAR BORGAONKAR (UK): PRIVACY ISSUES IN 4G. PHILIPPE LANGLOIS (FRANCE): something about mobile networks.

    Android Security Symposium 2017 Vienna Austria, March. Many interesting talks.

    Troopers Heidelberg, Germany. March. Hunting For Vulnerabilities in Signal by Jean-Philippe Aumasson, Markus Vervier. Samsung Pay: Tokenized Numbers, Flaws and Issues by Salvador Mendoza.

    TelcoSecDay @ Troopers It's no use crying over spilled 2G,3G,4G - what we need to fix in 5G. Outlook on 5G security from 3GPP perspective. Automated large-scale detection of rogue base stations: A field report. Exploring fraud in telephony networks, an illustration with Over-The-Top Bypass.

    Infiltrate Miami, FL. March. Jean-Philippe Aumasson, Markus Vervier: Hunting For Vulnerabilities in Signal. Georgi Geshev, Robert Miller: Logic Bug Hunting in Chrome on Android. Marco Grassi, Liang Chen: Remotely Compromising a Modern iOS Device. Vasilis Tsaousoglou, Patroklos Argyroudis: The Shadow over Android: Heap exploitation assistance for Android's libc allocator. Ralf-Phillip Weinmann: Did I hear a shell popping in your baseband?.


CFPs I'm not a fan or a user of WhatsApp but this backdoor story is just bad and will drive users away from a secure messaging app (maybe even the biggest install based of all of them). Zeynep Tufekci wrote an open letter to the Guardian to have them update the story. Moxie also wrote a blog post about these claims. The Guardian should have asked people with the technical expertise for advice before publishing the story.

AT&T 2G network shutdown happened on Dec 31 2016

AndroidXRef is looking for sponsors!

The mobile talks from 33c3 are all totally worth watching (no particular order): Pics of the month:



Links

Tuesday, December 13 2016

Mobile Security News Update December 2016

Conferences
    33c3 Hamburg, Germany 27-30 December. Downgrading iOS: From past to present by tihmstar. A look into the Mobile Messaging Black Box by Roland Schilling and Frieder Steinmetz. Dissecting modern (3G/4G) cellular modems by LaForge and holger. Geoloation methods in mobile networks by Erik.

    Shmoocon Washington D.C. January. A Context-Aware Kernel IPC Firewall for Android - David Wu, Sergey Bratus.

    Black Hat ASIA March 2017. FRIED APPLES: JAILBREAK DIY by Alex Hude and Max Bazaliy. MASHABLE: MOBILE APPLICATIONS OF SECRET HANDSHAKES OVER BLUETOOTH LE by Yan Michalevsky. REMOTELY COMPROMISING IOS VIA WI-FI AND ESCAPING THE SANDBOX by Marco Grassi.

I had to skip the November update due to a long overdue vacation. Playing with iOS webviews also did cost some time. Writing this blog becomes more and more time consuming since for some parts I would rather spent time on research than writing about other peoples research. Will see next year if I continue doing this or not. I'm doing this since January 2009 so it has been a few years.

New Conference: Samsung confirms it will render the US Note 7 useless with next update since the owners don't seem to care to return the phones to Samsung even tho they would get a replacement device. This is kind of hilarious.



Browser based iOS 9.3.x jailbreak (64bit only) it has been a while.

Chinese company installed secret backdoor on hundreds of thousands of phones


Recently the topic of SMS 2FA came up again. While I agree that SMS is not the most secure version of 2FA it is far far better then not providing any 2FA mechanism for your service.


Links

Saturday, December 10 2016

Kiwicon X

I finally made it to Kiwicon this year (special thanks to vt for dragging us out!). I even managed to get a talk in (con bucket list--) making the trip even sweeter.

The conference was absolutely awesome. Well organized, friendly people (staff and attendees!), and a perfect venue. The conference had about 2500 attendees which seemed like a good fit for the venue. I liked the overall program, the intermissions and speaker introductions were absolutely fantastic. In my opinion Kiwicon is at the sweet spot on the issues of size and target audience. It is big enough to be attract different kinds of folks and it is small enough to find people and hangout. I also really love single track conferences!

Sadly it was announced that this was the last Kiwicon, I'm happy to have made it to the last one! Thanks!

Below a few photos and videos from Kiwicon, the official Kiwicon photos are here.

KiwiCon intro #kiwicon #latergram

A video posted by Collin (@collin_rm) on

KiwiConX

A video posted by Collin (@collin_rm) on

KiwiCon sheep

A photo posted by Collin (@collin_rm) on

IR Fire detector #kiwicon

A video posted by Collin (@collin_rm) on

KiwiCon beer

A photo posted by Collin (@collin_rm) on


Tuesday, November 08 2016

iOS WebView auto dialer bug

TL;DR: iOS WebViews can be used to automatically call an attacker controlled phone number. The attack can block the phone's UI for a short amount of time and therefore prevent the victim from canceling the call. The bug is an application bug that likely is due to bad OS/framework defaults. One major issue with this vulnerability is that it is really easy to exploit. App developers have to fix their code as soon as possible. The Twitter and LinkedIn iOS apps are vulnerable (other apps might be vulnerable too). Demo videos here: Twitter and LinkedIn (embedded videos are below on this page).

About a week ago (on a Friday) I read an news post [1,2] about a guy who got arrested for accidentally DoSing 911 by creating a web page that automatically dialed 911 when visited it from an iPhone. This was most likely due to a bug with the handling of TEL URI [4,5]. I immediately thought about a bug I reported to Apple in late October 2008 [3]. I couldn't believe this bug has resurfaced so I investigated. The article said something about posting links on Twitter.
    If you think automatically dialing a phone number after clicking a link in an app is not a big issue think again. DoSing 911 is pretty terrible but there are other examples such as expensive 900 numbers where the attacker can actually make money. A stalker can make his victim dial his phone number so he gets his victim's number. Altogether things you don't want to happen.
Anyway ... I went and looked at the iOS Twitter app. I got a very simple auto phone dialer working in a very short time. I was happy and also devastated that it was that easy. I first thought I reproduced the exact bug but later after re-reading the articles [1,2] more carefully I determined that it is likely a different bug or at least a different trigger. The article reported heavy use of JavaScript and pop-ups being shown and such. My original trigger was one line of HTML (a meta-refresh tag that points to a TEL URL) due to this I decided to report the bug to Twitter via their Bug Bounty program on HackerOne. I never reported to a bug bounty program before so I was happy to gain some experience (I normally report via security@), but it is 2016 and companies pay for bugs so here we go. Twitter acknowledged that it looks like a problem within a few days.
    On Nov. 6th I updated the bug report to Twitter to add the UI blocking issue (continue reading) and uploaded a video. Today Twitter simply closes the bug as a duplicate without any comment. While this might be a simple duplicate they should have an interest in playing nice and being thankful to those who report bugs they find in their spare time. Because of this action I decided to post the full details of the issue today.

During the weekend I took some time to further investigate the issue. I determined that this might be a general issue with iOS apps the use WebViews to display content. I tested a few popular apps I had installed. Vulnerable apps need a way for users to post web links that will be opened in a WebView inside the app itself. Apps that open links in mobile Safari or Chrome would not be vulnerable (I tested this). One app I tested fairly early was the LinkedIn app since LinkedIn basically is social media for the business context. People can send messages and post updates. Updates usually are text and link. I posted a link and clicked it and yes it dialed my other phone (demo video below).

I wanted to submit the bug to LinkedIn and found that they have a bug bounty program. Unfortunately it was a private bounty and you would only be added if you previously submitted bugs. I tried to get around it but it didn't work. After some thinking I decided to not report it to LinkedIn privately but openly (parallel to this blog post). It is 2016 after all and if they don't want to add me to their program that is their choice. In general I will likely not report bugs outside of a bug bounty program if a private bug bounty program exists.

Another weekend comes I have some time and started playing with the bug again. Actually I started looking at my PoC from 2008 while trying to figure out if I report the bug to LinkedIn or not. After playing around for a bit I more or less get my old PoC working with the Twitter and LinkedIn apps. WOW!

Taking one step backwards. The original bug I reported to Twitter was triggering a phone call by visiting a website that redirect to a TEL URL. One could do this with various techniques such as: http-meta refresh, iframe, setting document.location, window.location, or an HTTP redirect (Location header). This would simply dial a number. The victim would see the dialer and the target number on the screen and of course could just cancel the call by pressing the big red button. Just causing the call is already bad since an unobservant person will be baffled (why is my phone dialing some number).

The beauty of my 2008 bug was that I could block the phone's UI for a few seconds and therefore prevent the user from canceling the call. I managed to abuse exactly the same trick to block the UI that I used in 2008. The trick is to cause the OS to open a second application while the phone is dialing the given number. Opening applications is pretty straight forward, you open a URL that causes the OS to spawn another application. This can be anything from the messages app (via the SMS: URL) or iTunes (via the itms-apps: URL). You can pretty much get any application to launch that has a URI binding. In 2008 I used a SMS URL with a really really long phone number to block the UI thread. My best guess on how this works is that the IPC subsystem actually has difficulties to move several kilobytes of URL data through the various layers into the app and the target app might also not be super happy about really large URLs. I ended-up with the code below. The code uses the combination of meta-refresh tag and window.location to execute the attack. The codes delays setting the window.location by 1.3 seconds to guarantee that the dialer is executed first. The delay cannot be too long otherwise the WebView will not execute the URL handler for launching the messages app. Basically you have to get the timing just right.


The PoC to trigger this bug.

Below two video demonstrations of this attack. You can clearly see that the UI is not responsive for a short amount of time. The time is long enough to make somebody pickup on the other side (especially service hot lines automatically pickup).






Normal good app behavior:
Apps should normally check the URL schema before executing it and show the user a pop-up dialog before executing an app on the device. Some examples are shown below:


Mobile Safari asking before calling the Apple Support number. This is how good apps should behave!


Dropbox showing a warning but not showing the target number. Ok but could be better.


The Yelp app normally behaves like Safari but if you hit it with an HTTP redirect it does not show the target number. I just included this for the fun of it.

App developers should review their use of WebViews to determine if they are vulnerable to this attack. Vulnerable apps need to be fixed. Service providers like Twitter and LinkedIn can inspect links posted to their sites for containing malicious code and prevent those links from being posted to their service.

Apple should change the default behavior of WebViews to exclude execution of TEL URIs and make it an explicit feature to avoid this kind of issues in the future. I reported this issue to Apple.

References:

Friday, November 04 2016

Using Google Fi on an iPhone

TL;DR: Google Fi on an iPhone is iMessage plus Google Wifi calling with awesome international coverage.

Google Project Fi is super interesting as it provides an actual low cost alternative to other carriers especially if you travel. The free data-only SIM is also a nice add-on.

Project Fi is exclusively targeting users of Google Nexus Android devices and you actually need one of the supported phones to activate the SIM which can be ordered on the Fi website.

I currently use an iPhone SE (mainly due to the device's tech specs and form-factor - I can't stand phablets!) so I was curious if I can just buy a Google Fi SIM and use it in an iPhone or any other phone actually. Of course I'm not the first person to think about this, but the only decent article on this topic is this one. Sadly most articles that are returned for a search on iPhone Google Fi are just totally useless. Even this article is not good.

I decided to just order Google Fi and a data-only SIM and give it a try. I used a Nexus 5x that I have access to for activating the SIM card. The activation process is really simple. Basically you need to put the SIM card into a compatible phone and install the Google Fi app. Done.

The activated SIM card can be put into any other phone, I tried an iPhone 5c and it just works. You automatically get the APN settings (the mobile data settings) pushed to your phone. Cellular data immediately works! Voice calls work too.

Wifi calling also works, although it (obviously) only works via the Hangout app but it does work. I put my phone into airplane mode and called the number from another phone and yea it rings.

The only service that is a bit unsatisfying is SMS (text messaging). The default option for Google Fi is to send and receive SMS via Google Hangout. Google Hangout exists for iOS and if you login with your Google Account that is associated with your Google Fi service you just install Hangouts and everything just works! If you actually want to use the iOS Messages app you can deactivate SMS via Hangout in the Hangout app on your phone. This will allow you to send and receive SMS via Messages. The only issue here is that incoming SMS messages get some Google specific data attached, as shown below. This is a little annoying but is only on incoming messages (you don't look like an idiot when sending messages to other people). Most of my contacts are on iMessage anyway these days so this is a non issue. Also I'm ok with using Hangouts for SMS since yea iMessage and other messaging apps.


The switch to change between native SMS and Hangout SMS the switch above it does the same for voice calls (to enable Wifi calling).


The broken* incoming SMS, the ~Dgr... is added by Google Fi, this does not show up in Hangouts. Other people have reported that this just went away after short time.

Things that don't work? switching between T-Mobile, Sprint, and US Cellular since this is done via the Google Fi app on Android devices (I actually don't have any idea about this yet).

Preliminary Conclusions
    Altogether Google Fi looks pretty cool and works with an iPhone (besides the hick-up with SMS). iMessage works (it is just an Internet service after all). Wifi calling via Hangouts is nice.

    If you are a hardcore iOS/Mac user Google Fi is too much Google for you. I'm a Linux user with an iPhone so Google Fi makes a lot of sense. Desktop calls and SMS via Hangouts is a nice thing to have in addition to iMessage.


Google Fi on an oooold phone (Android 4.0). Hangouts seem to work fine too.

*The data is a BASE64 encoded blob, no obvious data after looking at a bunch of them of an hour or less.

Tuesday, October 18 2016

Mobile Security News Update October 2016

Conferences
    PacSec October, Tokyo. Demystifying the Secure Enclave Processor by Mathew Solnik. Finding Vulnerabilities in Firefox for iOS by Muneaki Nishimura.

    ACM CCS Workshop on Security and Privacy in Smartphones and Mobile Devices (SPSM) October, Vienna Austria. All talks are related to mobile security.

    O'Reilly Security Conference October, NYC. Securing 85% of the world's smartphones by Adrian Ludwig. How Plantronics honed its headsets to create secure wearables by Erik Perotti.

    SyScan360 November, Shanghai. Browser Bug Hunting and Mobile by Francisco Alonso and Jaime Penalba. Demystifying the Secure Enclave Processor by Mathew Solnik. Running Code in the TrustZone Land by Edgar Barbosa. Analysis of iOS 9.3.3 Jailbreak & Security Enhancements of iOS 10 by Team Pangu. Security Vulnerabilities on Online Payment: Summary and Detection by Zhang Qing and Bai Guangdong.

    KiwiCon November Wellington, NZ. Let's do the Timewarp Again by Karit.


I'm going to be at the O'Reilly Security Conference on Monday the 31st (maybe also the other days). I super excited to speak at KiwiCon this year!

I'm interested in Google's Project Fi does anybody have insights into using it with non Android phones? I've found several posts on this topic but nothing convincing yet. Posts also seem conflicting.


Best of mobile security in pictures:

source ThreatPost

I've seen this warning a lot in the last couple of weeks while traveling:
This is the real reason for the Galaxy Note 7 recall

While searching for the link to the recall:


Links